INTRODUCTION
Minimum wages were introduced in the Baltic States together with other market-economic labour market institutions at the beginning of the transition from socialism to a market economy in 1991. In the Soviet system wages were controlled administratively and the wage distribution was somewhat compressed. As a result, after the liberalization of wage setting, wage inequality, in common with returns to education, increased markedly. On the one hand, this tendency was positive as it stimulated the flexibility and mobility of the workforce (Kuddo 1995) . On the other hand, relatively high inequality has given rise to a number of challenges (poverty, working poor, and so on). It is in this context that the minimum wage is seen as part of the solution in addressing poverty and inequalities. At the same time, the minimum wage has returned to the centre of po1icy debates due to the problem of labour shortages faced by employers in several sectors and the issue of significant migration to other EU countries, which has contributed to unbalancing the labour supply even further. This also explains why the social partners' perception of the role of minimum wages in the labour market has changed over time, including from the employers' side.
This chapter analyses the role of minimum wages in the labour markets of the Baltic States with a particular focus on Estonia, with comparative developments in Latvia and Lithuania since 1995. We start with an overview of the minimum wage-setting mechanisms and minimum wage recipients (Section 4.2), then analyse minimum wage development in the overall context of national wage development to see whether it has influenced wage disparities (Section 4.3), as well as detailing the impact of minimum wages on labour markets from various standpoints, such as employment, migration and FDI (Section 4.4) . In the first case study we analyse whether minimum wage policy might address the challenges created by massive labour migration since EU accession. In the second case study we try to shed some light on the issues of collective bargaining, using health care as an example. Case study 3 looks at how the incidences of minimum wages and unreported income (so-called "envelope wages") are related, motivated by the fact that many of the recipients of the official minimum wage receive extra, unreported wage payments.
The evidence is based on macro data, previous studies and reports, and on our own calculations, as well as on micro data (for example, labour force surveys) and interviews. Although there are some differences between the Baltic States, there are sufficient points of similarity for them to be viewed as a discrete group (see, for example, Eamets and Paas, 2007) .
EVOLVING POLICY OBJECTIVES, FIXING

MrnC~SMSANDCOVERAGE
All three Baltic countries introduced national minimum wages at the beginning of the transition in the form of a single statutory national minimum wage that applies essentially to all employees without distinction. Such an arrangement is exceptional in Europe where, in general, differentiated rates apply to workers, depending on where they work and/or their personal characteristics and work situation (Carley, 2006) . In the Baltic States there have been discussions concerning, for example, fixing the minimum wage at a lower level for young people.
In all the Baltic States representatives of employers and employees participate in the national minimum wage setting process (see also Eamets et al. 2007) . Participation varies from a merely advisory role in Lithuania to reaching bilateral agreements that are then legalized by government degree in Estonia (see Table 4 .1). At the beginning of the new millennium economic growth with a relatively high increase in average wages gave trade unions good grounds for demanding a minimum wage increase in Estonia and, in 2001 , central organizations of employees and employers signed an agreement on the principles for establishing the minimum wage that envisaged a rise to 41 per cent of the national average wage by 2008. However, this target was not achieved (in the first quarter of 2008 the minimum wage constituted 35 per cent of the average wage ).1 The purpose of the agreement was to raise the ratio of minimum wage to average wage to the average level ofEU countries, which was the reason for setting the target at 41 per cent (Kriis, 2001 ). In the agree- * From September 2003 until December 2006 a separate rate was set for certain groups of employees (state politicians, judges, national civil servants, civil servants and soldiers). It was irrelevant for our purposes, however, because none of these groups receives the minimum wage.
gives enterprises time to adapt to minimum wage increases. In 2006, trade unions in Lithuania proposed that the minimum wage should be raised to 50 per cent of the average wage, and held at that level thereafter in order to ensure economic stability. Representatives of employers and employees expressed reservations regarding the trade unions' proposals and considered that the 50 per cent differential between the minimum wage and average wage was too high (Blaziene, 2007) ; in the first quarter of 2008 the minimum wage constituted 37 per cent of the average wage. In Estonia, minimum wages are adjusted on an annual basis, while in Latvia and Lithuania the adjustment occurs regularly, but generally at longer intervals (European Foundation 2006) . In recent years, however, adjustment has occurred on an annual basis also in Latvia and Lithuania. When adjusting the minimum wage, various criteriasuch as inflation, productivity, developments in average wages, and so onmust be taken into consideration.
There is an active social dialogue in the Baltic States on minimum wage fixing. Table 4 .2 summarizes the standpoints of trade unions, employers and the respective governments on the minimum wage setting process. In Latvia, as in several other EU countries, trade unions have stated that the minimum wage has been set at too Iowa level, thus reducing its significance as a means of protecting employees (Carley 2006) . In the case of Estonia and Lithuania (as in some other new EU Member States with underdeveloped systems of sectoral collective bargaining) trade unions, despite favouring a statutory minimum wage, argue that the importance of minimum wages will decline if sectoral collective agreements, which set their own minimum rates, become more widespread. As a result, the statutory minimum wage could affect the development of collective bargaining. Employers' organizations espouse a wide range of views. In Lithuania employers do not seem to be particularly critical of the current minimum wage system. In Estonia, however, employers warn that further increases could endanger employment, notably within certain age groups. Employers in Latvia have mixed opinions on whether an increase in the minimum wage would help to stop the current high labour emigration or whether it would have an adverse effect on competitiveness. In Estonia, employers have proposed a system of greater differentiation of minimum wages in terms of skills, regions and/or sectoral differences, as well as changing the adjustment mechanism or criteria. It has been proposed that higher minimum wages would reduce unfair competition, among other issues (curtailing the incidence of undeclared wages) and enable workers to benefit from economic growth.
In Latvia and Lithuania, the governments have used minimum wages as an instrument of social protection. The governments of both countries have also indicated that the increasing of tax revenues is an important goal -this is related to the incidence of unreported income in the Baltic States (we shall Increasing the minimum Some small companies wages should apply wage helps to stop the will not be able to pay to less competitive groups emigration of the an increased minimum in the labour market. Rate workforce and facilitate wage. Current practice of minimum wage growth fair competition, but is acceptable should not be higher than high minimum wage labour productivity growth levels also influence in industry. Further competitiveness increases could put negatively; no assessment employment at risk in of employment effects some sectors and age groups Source: European Foundation (2006), Eamets et al. (2007) , EIRO, own amendments. revisit this issue below). On the other hand, as minimum wage increases also raise government expenditure (since the minimum wage is the actual wage rate in many public sector jobs), the governments have analysed proposed minimum wage increases from that perspective. In Estonia, the government considers minimum wages to be one of the most important issues in tripartite negotiations. To sum up, although different social partners have adopted different standpoints regarding the minimum wage, the existence of the minimum wage and its effects have not been major issues in the Baltic States to date (European Foundation, 2006) .
The importance of the minimum wage for the labour market depends on the percentage of employees receiving it. The proportion of full-time employees earning the minimum rate varies considerably between the Baltic States Baltic States, 1999 Note: The data reported on the Eurostat website includes an obvious error in the figures for 2000 and 2001, with the value for the category "Total" shown as much higher than the sum of the values for "Males" and "Females".
Source: Eurostat.
( Figure 4 .1). In 2007, the percentage of workers on the minimum wage was 4.7 per cent in Estonia, 6.7 per cent in Lithuania and 9.2 per cent in Latvia. The Latvian and Lithuanian figures have been among the highest in the EU, which is surprising given the modest level of the minimum wage. While, for earlier years, large inter-country differences could be explained by the much higher value of the minimum wage/average wage ratio (Kaitz index) for Lithuania, in 2004 the Kaitz index was only a few percentage points lower in Estonia, but the proportion of minimum earners in Estonia was about half that in Lithuania. In Estonia, the share of employees earning the minimum wage has decreased gradually since 2001. Since, in the Baltic States, the minimum wage is imposed nationally, in principle no full-time employed person should earn below the statutory minimum. However, this is not the case. For instance, according to Hinnosaar and Room (2003) Estonian Labour Force Survey (LFS) data for 1995-2000 show that about 8 per cent of people earned wages below the legal minimum. When interpreting the numbers on minimum wage recipients we must take into account also widespread (although probably decreasing) unreported wages (so-called "envelope wages") in the Baltic States. The actual proportion of workers earning the minimum wage is therefore certainly significantly smaller Yl6stalo, 1999, 2003; Eamets et al. 2008) . The issue of unreported wages is tackled in detail in Case study 3 (see Section 4.4). The fact that the proportion of workers earning the minimum wage is decreasing in all three countries can be explained both in terms of the declining incidence of envelope wages following the more stringent controls imposed by the tax authorities and the decreasing wage inequality resulting from changes in wage distribution policy (see Section 4.3 for more details). Our calculations, using Estonian LFS data, indicate that the proportion of minimum wage recipients differs for various labour market segments in Estonia. While, in 2005, the total average was 5.3 per cent, the proportion of minimum wage recipients was higher among females (7.7 per cent), nonEstonians (8.2 per cent), the age group 55-74 (9.6 per cent) and people with only a primary education (5.6 per cent); a situation that reflects the general wage disparities in Estonia. Regional differences are significant; the rate is highest in north-east Estonia (10.7 per cent) where the unemployment rate has been the highest since regaining independence, and relatively low in northern Estonia, including the capital, Tallinn (3.9 per cent). The proportion is 14.2 per cent in the primary, 3.3 per cent in the secondary and 5.9 per cent in the tertiary sector. Among firms with more than 50 employees, the proportion is 3.4 per cent and among micro firms (up to 9 employees) 9.6 per cent, reflecting also the higher incidence of envelope wages among small firms. There were significant differences between unionized and non-unionized workers (in 2000, 1.9 and 8.4 per cent respectively), although the gap has narrowed (in 2005 the totals were 2.1 and 5.2 per cent respectively), showing that minimum wages can, to some extent, compensate for a lack of collective bargaining. There is also a higher proportion of minimum wage earners among employees with temporary contracts compared to those with permanent contracts (11.2 versus 4.8 per cent in 2005), which illustrates the usefulness of the minimum wage in improving the situation of atypical workers.
MINIMUM WAGE DEVELOPMENTS
Minimum wage increases within national wage trends
The increase of minimum wages in the Baltic States appears impressive in absolute terms (Table 4. 3). The Baltic States have had some of the highest minimum wage increases in Europe: in 2004 the highest increase, at 14.8 per cent, was found in Estonia and in 2005 the highest was in Lithuania, at 10 per cent (European Industrial Relations Observatory 2006) . In Estonia, taking 1996 as a baseline, the minimum wage was almost four and a half times higher in 2006, while the average wage had increased more modestly (by approximately three times). However, this should be viewed in the wider context of wage dynamics. Average wages have increased quite rapidly in the Baltic States. As Estonia (in line with Latvia and Lithuania) has a fixed exchange rate regime, developments in both nominal and real wages are important in terms of international competitiveness. In the second half of the 1990s, the growth rates of average and minimum wages in nominal terms were remarkably high, but inflation reduced real growth rates. Since 1999, the growth rates of both minimum and average wages have been more modest. In Estonia the average growth rate of nominal wages was 15 per cent while that of real wages was 6 per cent in 1995-2005. The acceleration of wage growth since 2004 can be explained by the shortage of labour due to strong economic growth, declining unemployment rates, migration of labour and, perhaps to some extent, the more active role of the trade unions. In 2005, the average wage in nominal terms was approximately 3.4 times higher than in 1995. In real terms, however, the wage increase was 65 per cent. The most recent developments have shown wage growth well ahead of productivity growth in all three Baltic States; in 2006, the difference between the growth rates of wages and productivity was around 8 percentage points. Employers are constantly warning that wage growth exceeding productivity growth will be detrimental to competitiveness in the longer run. In 2007 and 2008, wage pressure diminished due to the economic slowdown.
The growth rate of minimum wages has outrun the inflation rate in Estonia; in Latvia, in some years the real minimum wage increase has been negative; and in Lithuania, the minimum wage has risen in line with, or behind, consumer prices in most years (Carley, 2006) . The minimum wage increase was highest in Latvia at the beginning of 2007 (33 per cent). In Estonia, nominal minimum wage increases for the period under observation have been around 8-17 per cent, with real minimum wage increases at around 4-15 per cent; the increase has been quite steady and minimum wage developments relatively predictable. In 1998 and 1999, the average wage growth rate was very modest due to the Russian crisis, indicating high flexibility in the labour market; in some industries in the Baltic States wages even dropped (see Paas et aI., 2003a) . Similarly to average wages, the growth rates of minimum wages were relatively low in 1999; whereas the growth rate in 1998 was still rather high as it had been agreed at the beginning ofthe year and the possibility of the crisis was not foreseen at the time of the decision.
The ratio of the minimum wage to the average wage (the Kaitz index -see above), has increased to varying degrees in all the Baltic States (Figure 4 .2). In Estonia, the Kaitz index dropped from 37 per cent to 23 per cent between 1992 and 1996 (Philips 2001) ; since then it has been gradually increasing and peaked at 33 per cent in 2005. In 2005 and 2006, the ratio decreased slightly because, as a result of the wage pressures caused by favourable economic conditions and labour scarcity, the growth rate of the average wage exceeded the growth rate of the minimum wage. From 2007 to 2008, the ratio increased again in all three countries owing to high minimum wage increases and the start of the economic downturn, which resulted in a more moderate average wage increase. Over time, despite differentiated yearly trends, the minimum wage to average wage ratio has converged in the three Baltic states, at around 37 per cent, not far below the EU average (40 per cent). However, the eco-' nomic crisis, which is affecting the Baltic States particularly severely, may interrupt this convergence process. In 2009, as a result of the crisis, it was not possible to revise the minimum wage upwards in either Estonia (where no agreement could be reached) or Lithuania. Only in Latvia was the minimum wage increased in early 2009, by 13 per cent (up to 180 lats), with tripartite negotiations confirming the increase in order to prevent a further reduction in welfare levels. Overall, however, the long-term minimum wage increase observed in the Baltic states since the mid-1990s is likely to be interrupted in 2009. Obviously, the nature of the crisis will influence whether or not this turns out to be a short-or a longer-term phenomenon.
Minimum wage and income distribution
The impact of minimum wages on income distribution depends on the share of wage income in GDP; a low labour share may be used to justify policy measures such as higher minimum wages. In the Baltic States (see Table 4 .4) in recent years, the labour share has been in the range of37-50 per cent, that is, lower than the EU-15 average, which may indicate the relatively weak position of labour in comparison to capital (Eamets et aI., 2008) if we recall the low levels of unionization and collective agreement coverage in the Baltic States. The low labour share reflects relatively lower wages; that is, compared to the EU-15 the differences between productivity levels are much smaller than those of labour costs, though this discrepancy is more noticeable in other Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries than in the Baltic States (Galg6czi and Mermet, 2003) . In Estonia, the figure has been remarkably stable at 44-45 per cent, while in Latvia and Lithuania, labour shares decreased at the beginning of the period and have increased thereafter. Stable or growing labour share in relation to a stable or declining minimum wage/average wage ratio suggests that minimum wages have not played a critical role in the dynamics of labour share, although further evidence to support this view is lacking. The relatively low minimum wage level is probably only one factor behind the low labour share of the Baltic States. However, a low labour share also reduces the potential impact of minimum wages on overall inequality. The Baltic States are characterized by relatively high levels of inequality in comparison to EU-lS Member States, the Gini indexes being in the range of 0.31-0.37. In our opinion, that is due to both the relatively low labour share and high wage inequality. Alongside Poland and Slovenia, the Baltic States have the most extreme earnings inequalities in the EU. While, in most EU states in 2002, the value of the 9th/1st decile ratio was in the range of2 to 3.S, in all three Baltic States the ratio exceeded 4.S (European Commission, 200S) . Low minimum wages certainly contribute to the high wage inequality, but many other factors are also important, such as low unionization, high returns on higher education, and so on. Our calculations, based on the Estonian LFS (Table 4 .4), show that the wage distribution has recently been somewhat compressed in Estonia: while in 1997 the wage disparity between the highest and lowest wage deciles was four times, in 200S it was approximately three times. The more active minimum wage policy may have contributed to this. From 200S to 2007 the wage disparity increased slightly.
MINIMUM WAGE EFFECTS
Low pay and poverty: the contribution of the minimum wage
The percentage of low-paid workers has steadily decreased in Estonia. Based on our calculations using Estonian LFS data, while in the late 1990s wages were below two-thirds of the average for almost one-third of employees (34 per cent in 1998), by 2005 the figure had fallen to 29 per cent, recovering somewhat in 2006 and 2007 to 31 per cent and 30 per cent, respectively. The fact that the Kaitz index rose during 1998-2005 from 27 per cent to 33 per cent may suggest that minimum wages have played some role in these developments. Of course, we cannot overlook the other developments in the economy and labour market. The same conclusion should apply to the percentage of workers defined as working poor. According to the Eurostat definition of "inwork poor'',2 in 2005 the in-work at-risk-of-poverty rate was 7 per cent in Estonia, 9 per cent in Latvia and 10 per cent in Lithuania (the unweighted average for the EU-24 is 8 per cent). In 2000, the rates were 10 per cent for Estonia, 13 per cent for Latvia and 14 per cent for Lithuania. Thus, the numbers have fallen from a relatively high level to a level closer to that more frequently observed in Europe. Given that the labour markets of the Baltic States are relatively flexible (including minimum wages), the in-work at-risk-ofpoverty rate is currently not high.
There is no official poverty line in Estonia; however, unofficial estimates have been provided since 1997 (Table 4 .5). Until 2004, the subsistence minimum was lower than the absolute poverty line in Estonia. 3 Since 2005, the absolute poverty line has been defined as the subsistence minimum, so the two indicators are now identical. As average wage and minimum wage increases have significantly exceeded the growth rate of the absolute poverty line, the minimum wage/poverty line and average wage/poverty line ratios have increased fairly rapidly. While from 1997 to 2000 the absolute poverty line was higher than the minimum wage, in 2001 the trend reversed and, since then, the minimum wage/poverty line ratio has increased rather rapidly, reaching 1.44 in 2006. As the minimum wage exceeds the poverty line and the subsistence minimum, all full-time employees earning at least the minimum wage 2. The in-work poor are defined as individuals who are classified as employed according to their most frequent activity status and whose household equivalized disposable income is below 60 per cent of national median equivalized income. 3. The unofficial poverty line was estimated in 1998-99 from the households' consumption data by using national consumption weights; subsequently the number was corrected by means of the consumer price index (Tiit, 2006) . Subsistence minimum is the minimum amount of resources needed to preserve and restore the labour force. are not considered to be poor in the context of absolute poverty and the subsistence minimum. Thus, increases in minimum wages may have had a positive effect on poverty reduction. At the same time, it is probable that other factors may have played a role, such as generally strong economic growth, declining unemployment and the general increase in wages. Hinnosaar and Room (2003) argue that, at least in the second half of the 1990s, increases in the minimum wage did not so much reduce poverty as reduce the employment of those affected by minimum wage increases (although the effect was fairly modest, see Section 4.4.2) and many of the unemployed would have agreed to work for less than the minimum wage; in their view it would have been better to try to reduce poverty by other means, such as a lower tax burden on low-wage employees. Minimum wages could reduce poverty and inequality by setting a floor for wages in low-pay industries. In the Baltic States, industry wage differences are striking. Figure 4 .3 presents the Kaitz index by industry for Estonia and Lithuania. Although, in the Baltic States, statutory minimum wages are not differentiated across industries, occupations, and so on, in low-wage industries the Kaitz index may be much higher. In Estonia, in certain low-pay sectors (especially manufacturing), the Kaitz index is much higher than the economy average: in clothing 51 per cent, textiles 47 per cent and agriculture 44 per cent in 2005 (Figure 4.3) . In some of these sectors the Kaitz index has increased rapidly in recent years as wage growth has been rather modest. In hotels and restaurants the ratio is not markedly different from that of the total economyit is also claimed that this is the industry with the highest incidence of 
-- 
Wage disparities: some effects despite some spillover
Another potential impact of the minimum wage is the reduction of wage disparities. In the Baltic States, the trade unions have supported the use of minimum wages as an income-equalizing measure. As we have seen, wage disparity has decreased in Estonia in recent years but, in the context of other national wage developments, this may be due to factors other than the increase of minimum wages. Generally, the impact of the minimum wage on wage disparity depends on spillover effects that occur when minimum wage increases bring about overall wage increases. If this effect is strong, the effect of the minimum wage in reducing wage disparity is limited. 4 According to the Bank of Estonia wage survey undertaken among 250 firms in 2006, 30 per cent of respondents answered "yes, certainly" or "probably yes" to the question "Do minimum wage increases influence the wages of workers earning more than the minimum wage?". The share was higher in hotels and restaurants (as high as 56 per cent) and real estate and business services (39 per cent), where the proportion of minimum wage earners is higher. While among micro-firms (up to 9 employees) spillover effects exist in about 37 per cent of firms, among other firms the figure is 26 per cent. Hence, changes in minimum wages have the greatest impact on small firms' labour costs. Minimum wage spillover effects were also stronger among firms where wages were below average parent industry wages. So, we can conclude that relatively wide spillover effects in Estonia would limit the impact of minimum wages on wage compression. Hinnosaar and Room (2003) , in their study on minimum wage employment effects, argued that during 1995-2000 the labour market responded to increased minimum wages through reduced employment rather than through wage adjustments. Krillo and Alloja (2006) analysed the impact of a hypothetical 'increase of the minimum wage to 60 per cent of the average wage; 4. Wage spillover effects exist if, in the case of minimum wage increases, the wages of workers earning more than the minimum wage are also increased. Thus, the existence of these effects decreases the impact of minimum wages on wage disparities. In the context of the low share of minimum wage recipients in Estonia, minimum wages may have more impact on wage formation at the aggregate level if the wages of employees earning more than the minimum wages are also adjusted in the case of a minimum wage increase.
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Employment: minimum wage encouraging greater participation
This section gives an overview of the existing (not very extensive) econometric evidence on the impact of minimum wage increases on employment and activity levels in the Baltic States. Hinnosaar and Room (2003) analysed the impact of minimum wage increases in Estonia on employment and wages using the Estonian LFS data for the period 1995-2000, during which minimum wages increased several times. When estimating the effect of minimum wage increases, workers selected from a period prior to the minimum wage increase were used as a control group. The results indicated that minimum wage increases reduced the employment of workers directly affected by the change (those whose wages were raised as a result; for the rest the results were not significant). However, other groups (those earning either below or above the minimum wage) were not influenced. The relatively small size of the effect (10 per cent increase leading to employment reduction in the range of 0.43 to 0.66 per cent among the workers directly affected by the change) was, in the authors' view, surprisingly low; one possible explanation was the low compliance with minimum wage regulations (non-negligible proportion of employees earning below the minimum wage). The additional negative effect was thus due to an increase in the share of workers receiving wages below the legally set minimum; that is, substitution took place between the formal and informal sectors. Room and Uuskiila (2006) analysed the impact of minimum wages using the results of a survey of Estonian companies concerning their wage formation processes. According to the responses, the minimum wage increase in 2005, from EEK 2,480 to EEK 2,690 (approximately 8.5 percentage points) reduced employment by 0.17 per cent. Again, the impact is fairly low, but in line with many other studies. Hazans (2007) found that, in the case of Lithuania, an increase in after-tax real minimum wages appears to have, on average, a positive effect on participation. Reported marginal effects imply that a modest 5 per cent increase in after-tax minimum wages results in higher participation for women of 2.7 percentage points and of 1.2 points for men. In Estonia, the positive effect of minimum wages on participation is, by contrast, limited to teenagers of both genders and young males. A 10 per cent increase in real minimum wages boosts the participation of these two groups by 2 and 3 percentage points, respectively. The minimum wage can therefore have a positive effect on the employment of certain categories, a dimension that may be important in the current context of labour shortages and migration.
One issue to consider is whether or not minimum wage effects differ across the three Baltic States. There are some differences in fixing mechanisms, such as the different periodicity of adjustments and objectives. For instance, the relatively weaker sanctions in cases of non-compliance with minimum wage regulations in Estonia (see Table 4 .1) might limit any labour market impact of minimum wages. The criteria for minimum wage adjustments, including those more related to economic performance (consumer price index and labour productivity), as in the case of Estonia, might limit the negative labour market effects of minimum wage increases.
Minimum wages combined with collective wage bargaining
The "crowding out" hypothesis argues that relatively strict regulation of minimum wages is related to a low rate of unionization, thus minimum wage regulation may crowd out collective bargaining (Aghion et aI., 2008) . In the Baltic States, both union density and collective agreement coverage are among the lowest in the enlarged EU (Masso and Eamets, 2007) . In 2004, collective agreement coverage was 22 per cent in Estonia, 20 per cent in Latvia and 15 per cent in Lithuania; the EU-lS average was 72 per cent and that of the EU-24, 63 per cent; union density was around 14-16 per cent. The low level of collective agreement coverage is due to the lack of binding collective agreements higher than the enterprise level; that is, sectoral-level bargaining has been relatively rare in the Baltic States (although not unknown) and enterprise-level agreements are the most common form. While the power of the unions has decreased in the old EU Member States, the reduction in the Baltic States has been due to different causes, such as the transformation from an obligatory system to voluntary union membership, which had particularly dramatic consequences. The other reasons are similar to the factors involved in declining unionism in Western Europe: the growing share of the services sector and of small and medium-sized enterprises, and so on. The main task of national-level bargaining is to determine the level of minimum wages, although a number of other questions are involved (labour market legislation, social reforms, and so on).
Therefore, it is misleading to talk about a minimum wage having a crowding-out effect on collective bargaining. Nevertheless, in Estonia trade unions have expressed the criticism that a national minimum wage constrains the development of sectoral bargaining (see Table 4 .2). Van Gyes et ai. (2006) argued that while in the EU-lS minimum wages serve as a standard for all employees not covered by collective agreements and low-wage employees, in the new Member States minimum wages serve also as an orientation for collective bargaining at enterprise or sectoral level.
Minimum wages have not been set at particularly high levels, whether we look at the absolute level of minimum wages, the minimum wage/average wage ratio (Kaitz index) or the percentage of minimum wage recipients. Thus, such levels should usually leave room for collective agreements at the sectoral level. As there is no differentiation of minimum wages across age, regions and so on iIi the Baltic States, which may lead to the possibility that minimum wages are fixed at a level that leaves little room for collective bargaining on the wages of some groups of workers. 5 The low levels of union membership and collective agreement coverage are due to the other reasons cited above rather than the minimum wage policy applied. In fact, if we believe that setting the wage floor is necessary to solve labour market problems, there needs to be growth of sectoral-level agreements in the Baltic States, especially given that the national minimum wage is undifferentiated. In case study 2 we analyse wage negotiations in the health-care sector, one of the two sectors (the other being transport) in which sectoral agreements exist. The case study shows the need to complement the statutory minimum wage with sectoral collective bargaining.
Minimum wages in the context of EU mobility
The relationship between wage developments and the EU's three mobilities (of goods, capital and people) deserves attention, as the Baltic States are very open economies with a ratio of foreign trade (the sum of exports and imports) to GDP higher than 100 per cent; they have much inward (as well as outward) FDI and are mostly countries of origin for labour migration (the most important target countries being the United Kingdom, Ireland and the Nordic countries). Few studies are available which focus on the impact ofFDI on wages. Eamets and Kallaste (200412005) argue that much of the FDI into Estonia is aimed at taking the advantage of low labour costs and is vulnerable to wage increases; thus the threat of relocation cannot be ignored. According to the survey undertaken in 2001, the most important motives for foreign investors investing in Estonia were "labour" and "production costs" and, after that, "market potential". However, foreign investors' pursuit of low labour costs should not be overemphasized -most foreign investors were defined as market-seeking and only 18 per cent as efficiency seeking; that is, most investors did not invest with the main aim of taking advantage of low 5. Ifwe look at Figure 4 .3, we might say that in Lithuania in contrast to Estonia minimum wages are fixed at relatively high levels for some industries. But again, envelope wages might distort inter-industry wage differences.
Jaan Masso and Kerly Krillo -9781781000571 Downloaded from Elgar Online at 07/27/2019 02:45:15PM via free access production costs (Reiljan 2001) . Vahter (2005) showed that foreign-owned firms oriented to the domestic market had much lower labour productivity than those oriented to the international market. One explanation is the lower level of competition among the domestic market-oriented foreign firms (some of which are natural monopolies, such as utility companies). Thus, the foreignowned firms that are oriented to international markets are more vulnerable to wage increases. The impact of minimum wages on foreign investment is probably limited. A number of recent cases can be outlined in which wage increases have forced foreign-owned firms to close down their operations in Estonia. One of the best known cases is Kreenholm, formerly Estonia's largest textile producer, which reduced its workforce from 3,300 in 2006 to 2,500 in 2007 and then to around 1,000 in 2008; however, the wage pressures behind the developments were not due to minimum wage increases. Masso et al. (2008) showed that, at least in the earlier period 1995-2002, firms investing abroad increased their employment in Estonia after investment, which may indicate that the investments were not made with the intention of relocating production to countries with lower labour costs but for other reasons. However, in the context of the recent rapid wage growth, the intentions of outward investors may well change to some extent.
The recent wage increase has also harmed Estonia's foreign trade. A study by the Estonian Development Fund (2008) argued that the recent decline in export growth was caused on the one hand by the growing attractiveness of the domestic market, and, on the other hand, by rising wages that exporters are unable to pass on in the form of higher prices without raising productivity. Domestic market-oriented firms are less vulnerable to wage increases since they face less competition. However, the wage increase has not been due to the increase of minimum wages, but rather to other factors such as strong economic growth, labour migration, and so on.
One possible role of the minimum wage in the labour market is to exert a measure of control over international labour migration; for example, employers in Latvia (see Section 4.2) have indicated that a higher minimum wage would help to reduce labour emigration. Statistics on labour migration are scarce. In the case of Estonia about 2-3 per cent of all people active in the labour market work abroad each year (Estonian Development Fund 2008). The numbers are significantly larger in the cases of Latvia and Lithuania. During 2004-06 the number of workers registered in the United Kingdom per 1,000 of the economically active population of the sending country was more than 35,000 for Lithuania and more than 25,000 for Latvia, but just under 10,000 for Estonia (Hazans, 2008) . Reasons may include the somewhat higher wages in Estonia and the closeness of Finland (many people commute between the two countries). Certainly, the differences between wages in Estonia and the target countries of emigration are an important factor in labour migration. The study by the Estonian Development Fund (2008) showed that, during 2000-06, the difference between average wages in Estonia and the main target countries of Estonian labour migration (Finland, United Kingdom, Ireland, Norway, Sweden;Denmark and Germany) decreased by about 30-60 per cent. Thus, the wage increase in Estonia may have reduced the willingness to work abroad in a number of branches (such as construction). It is more difficult to assess the effect of national minimum wages on migration. Many groups of employees who are prepared to migrate have relatively high wages (for example, doctors, construction workers). Additionally, emigration requires certain language skills. It is true that most of the migration from the Baltic States to more developed EU countries has been unskilled, but there are no comprehensive statistics on the skill levels of migrants.
The relationship between wages and migration potential is analysed in one of our case studies.
CASE STUDIES Case study 1: What is the role of the minimum wage in migration?
Bearing in mind the fairly intense situation in the Estonian labour market due to the labour shortages caused by high economic growth in recent years, it is important to understand the influence of minimum wages on people's motivation to migrate. The aim of this case study is to analyse whether minimum wage earners are keener to work abroad than those earning higher wages. We do not take a mathematical approach to the causality between minimum wage policy and migration, but provide some qualitative analytical information on the issue, enabling us to identify the role of the Estonian minimum wage and wage level in migration decisions and to draw some labour policy conclusions on this basis.
Survey scope and methodology
For this analysis we use data from the survey carried out by Factum & Arico at the request of the Estonian Ministry of Social Affairs in October-November 2006. There is no analogous survey for 2007-08. The survey sample was 1,505 respondents (two-thirds of whom were employed) and the results can be extrapolated to the population as a whole.
The main aim of the case study is to examine whether the higher statutory minimum wage would function as a disincentive to work abroad. In the following analysis we grouped the employed into three groups: 1. those whose wages in the previous month were lower than or equal to the statutory minimum 6 (minimum-wage earners 7 ); 2.
those whose wages in the previous month were lower than two-thirds of the national average wage (below two-thirds of average earnersllowwage earners; this includes the first group); 3.
those whose wages in the previous month were higher than two-thirds of the national average wage (above two-thirds of average earnerslhighwage earners).
Differences in degrees of wage satisfaction
Comparison of wage satisfaction levels indicates that while there are no systematic differences in respect of satisfaction with the current wage between minimum wage earners and low-wage earners in general, they clearly differ 6. As the database does not include infonnation about the respondent's working hours, we cannot distinguish between persons who work fuII time and receive a wage not above the statutory minimum from those who work only a few hours and whose wage is therefore lower than the statutory minimum. 7. In our sample the proportion of minimum wage earners in employment is 9.8 per cent, which is higher than reported in the aggregated data released by Eurostat and Statistics Estonia. This is due to the fact that we have no infonnation about working hours and therefore it is likely that people who work part time and receive a wage below the statutory minimum are included in this category; however, this should not seriously jeopardize the results of the study. from the third group (Figure 4.4) . While approximately one-third oflow-wage earners are very satisfied or fairly satisfied with their wage, among high-wage earners this figure is almost twice as high (70 per cent). We can therefore conclude that, in general, those whose wages are higher find their jobs more in accordance with their needs, skills and knowledge. Therefore, the incentive to emigrate may be lower for high-wage earners than for low-wage earners. However, there are other interrelated factors (language skills, contacts with community, and so on) that may neutralize this effect.
Plans to go abroad differ by category
More high-wage earners have worked abroad compared to minimum wage earners (59 per cent of high-wage earners and 46 per cent of minimum wage earners, respectively).8 The likely explanation for this is self-selection: in general, those who emigrate are talented, socially active and have high ambitions (Redei, 2001; Borjas, 1987) . In addition, benefits for returned migrants may translate into improved or even unique skills, useful contacts, and so on, enabling access to better positions on the job ladder (Nicholson, 2004) . By using the propensity score-matching approach Hazans (2008) found, in the case of Latvia, that return migrants had, on average, 14 per cent higher wages.
8. It would be very useful to have an overview of the wages paid abroad and whether the job was in accordance with the worker's qualifications. However, although the questionnaire includes questions that would, in principle, enable us to analyse these issues ("How high was your salary abroad?"; "What was your wage compared to the locals?" and "Did you do a job that corresponds to your qualifications?"), the number ofrespondents is clearly too low to draw any reliable conclusions. With regard to the proportion of those who plan to go abroad to work in the future, somewhat surprisingly the proportion is higher among minimum wage earners than in other groups, although in all groups the majority of respondents declared that they either do not plan to work abroad or they have not thought about this option (Table 4 .6). However, it is likely that intentions are followed by actions more often in the case of high-wage earners than in the case of minimum wage earners: although proportionally more minimum wage earners compared to high-wage earners declare that they plan to work abroad or have at least considered the option, fewer of them have made any practical preparations (collected information, applied for a job, and so on).
Moreover, a higher proportion of minimum wage earners are rather poorly infonned and a lower proportion very well-informed about possibilities for working abroad compared to high-wage earners. While almost one in eight persons whose wage is above two-thirds of the national average declare that they are very well informed about the possibilities of working abroad, for minimum wage earners the figure is more than three times lower.
Higher wage abroad as the main determinant
The desire to obtain higher wages is considered to be a very important determinant for almost all respondents. A proportionately higher share of highwage earners compared to minimum wage/low-wage earners declare that wages are a very important determinant when considering working abroad (80 per cent compared to 65 per cent). This argument is supported by the fact that almost two-thirds of high-wage earners declare that they would accept a job abroad only if the wage was at least the same as that paid to local workers; for minimum wage earners the figure is considerably lower (58 per cent). For both minimum wage earners and low-paid workers, not only are wages are the main determinant, but they would be less demanding about wages in the host countries, probably because they know that such wages will in any case be well above the minimum wage in Estonia.
As expected, among high-wage earners the proportion of those who would accept a job of, at least, a comparable skill level is higher and the proportion of those who would accept any job is considerably lower than in the other two groups (Figure 4 .5). This lends some support to the notion that (minimum) wage policy may play some role in tackling issues of labour migration because, for minimum wage earners, wage level is relatively more important in comparison to other job characteristics.
Obstacles to working abroad
Several factors reduce individuals' motivation to work abroad. The questionnaire asks, "How important are the following factors as obstacles to working abroad in the future?", which enables us to analyse this aspect. A short overview of the answers is given below (Table 4 .7).
Lack of language skills is perceived as an important constraint with regard to working abroad, primarily for low-wage earners. This is a very relevant indicator for those to whom the language barrier is an obstacle (that is, above minimum wage earners and, more generally, low-wage earners) because their likelihood of emigration is low and probably not directly influenced by the level of the statutory minimum wage. The results are even more striking when the same question is asked about education and skills/on-the-job experience as an obstacle. Educational level is perceived as a serious obstacle to emigration for one-tenth of high-wage earners, but for more than 20 per cent of minimum wage earners. Similar results, although with slight differences in the proportions, apply to skills/working experience as an obstacle.
Moreover, low-wage earners are in general more anxious about their ability to adapt to the new environment than those whose wages are higher. This may be connected to the language barrier and can partly be explained by individual differences (skills, education, and so on). With regard to working opportunities in the home country, those on higher wages perceive their working position as being better than that of low-wage earners, indicating that high-wage earners find conditions on the national labour market somewhat more attractive than do low-wage earners. That is natural due to the differences in job positions: high-wage earners are most likely either to be specialists or of to have jobs of higher rank, while low-wage earners are more likely to have manual jobs. Several factors are similarly perceived as obstacles/not obstacles by both high-and low-wage earners. Cultural differences fall into this group (these are considered unimportant by one-third of the persons in each group and very important by one-tenth) and contacts in the home country (perceived as important by the majority of respondents). High expenses are one obstacle clearly perceived differently by high-and low-wage earners: while every second low-wage earner mentions it as a very important obstacle, for high-wage earners the figure is 22 per cent. This probably stems from the fact that in general persons belonging to the second group are financially more secure and have financial resources which enable them to settle in the new environment; low-wage earners, in contrast, lack the resources to finance emigration.
Concluding remarks
The analysis indicates that the minimum wage plays a role in the desire to emigrate and this is one determining factor for low-paid and minimum wage earners in Estonia. At the same time, other factors may playa role in limiting the influence of the minimum wage. In particular, low-wage earners face certain limitations that clearly restrict their ability to work abroad: they more often lack the language skills, in-work experience, general skills and financial resources needed to work abroad. They are more often anxious about their ability to cope in the new environment and reluctant to deal with the procedural requirements of moving abroad. Although a larger proportion of minimum wage earners declare that they have considered working abroad compared to high-wage earners, proportionately fewer of them have made any preparations or are as well-informed about the possibilities of working abroad. At the same time, this does not mean that these workers would not be sensitive to a minimum wage increase at home, considering the importance they attach to their wage level. The minimum wage may thus represent one element, alongside other factors, that may limit labour migration in the future, and thus also help to respond to labour shortages in certain sectors and worker categories.
Case study 2: Minimum wage and wage bargaining limit emigration in the health sector
In this case study we analyse how the minimum wage can complement collective bargaining within a general strategy to limit emigration in the Estonian health-care sector. This sector is interesting for several reasons. First, there are few examples of collectively agreed minimum wages at sectoral level in Estonia that complement statutory national minimum wage. Second, there is a lack of health-care specialists in Estonia, resulting in long treatment queues, which in tum have a negative influence on the future of health care in the country. There is the question of the emigration of young specialists, while older specialists progressively retire. This has led to an imbalance between supply and demand for certain categories, with consequent labour shortages further exacerbated by labour migration. The aim of this case study is to analyse the role that the minimum wage could play. Third, health-care specialists form a distinctive labour market segment due to the extensive period of study they undergo (that is, the high opportunity cost) and very specialized knowledge they acquire. Therefore the statutory minimum wage agreed at macro level is of minor relevance for certain healthcare specialists (doctors and nurses -the argument does not apply to care workers) who must have their wages negotiated through collective bargaining.
In the case study, in addition to statistical analysis, interviews were conducted with several people representing the key institutions in the wage bargaining process in Estonia in order to obtain a broader picture. 9 The limited number of health-care specialists in Estonia According to Ministry of Social Affairs data, on 1 July 2007 there were 5,338 doctors and 10,402 nurses registered in Estonia. It is estimated that approximately 21 per cent of doctors and 24 per cent of nurses do not work in the national (Estonian) health-care system (they have emigrated, retired· or their occupation is unknown). Based on the survey of medical establishments, the number of doctors working in Estonian per 1,000 of the population decreased in Estonia from 4.2 in 1990 to 3.3 in 2007; for medium-level medical personnel the numbers are 1l.7 and 7.6. 10 The employers are represented in the bargaining system by the Estonian Hospital Association (Eesti Haiglate Liit or EHL), which represents 22 major hospitals, and the government is represented by the Ministry of Social Affairs, as the wages of some professionals (doctors in training, ambulance workers, doctors/experts working for the Social Insurance Board and doctors working in prisons) are financed from the state budget. Health-care specialists are represented by four trade union organizations. The interests of the nurses and doctors are represented by the Estonian Nurses Union (Eesti Odede Lii! or EOL, the largest trade union organization in the health-care sector, representing 3,800 nurses) and the Estonian Medical Association (Eesti Arstide Liit or EAL, which has more than 2,600 members). The Trade Union Association of Health Officers of Estonia (Eesti Keskastme Tervishoiutootajate Kutseliit or EKTK) comprises nurses and other health officers. Finally, the Federation of Estonian Healthcare Professionals Unions (Eesti Tervishoiutootajate Ametiiihingute Liit or ETTAL, with approximately 2,300 members) organizes doctors, nurses, care assistants, professionals with university degrees and midranking professional staff, kitchen personnel, drivers, cleaners, departmental secretaries, customer service staff, and so on.
Nevertheless, the wages of health-care sector workers have increased quite rapidly in Estonia in the past six years, and in general have exceeded the growth of the national minimum wage (except in 2008, see Table 4 .8). There is no doubt that labour shortages and outward migration in this sector have played a role in such wage increases. Source: Eurostat, Statistics Estonia, Toomsalu (2008) . Table 4 .9 presents the main characteristics of the wages of health-care sector employees in Estonia in March 2007, the month before a new collective agreement came into force. It shows that the minimum wage was considerably more important for health-care workers than in the economy in general: while in 2006 and 2007 the share of the minimum wage in the national average was approximately 32 per cent, for nurses and care workers the figure was higher than 80 per cent and for doctors 76 per cent. For all health-care specialist categories that were included in the collective agreement coming into force in March 2007 the median wage was lower than average, indicating that a proportionately higher share of workers received wages that were lower than average. However, compared to the national average the wage distribution is much more compressed for health-care specialists. The main peculiarity of Estonian health sector wage negotiations is that although de jure bargaining is conducted between employers and employees, de facto a third party -the Health Insurance Fund (Eesti Haigekassa or EHK) -is indirectly involved since hospital managers' ability to increase wages depends on the EHK's financial contribution in the budget year in question. This may explain why the contents (notably on wages) of collective agreements are not always respected in this sector. Some health-care specialists (13 per cent of doctors, 5 per cent of nurses and I per cent of care workers) earned wages lower than laid down in the collective agreement. When adding regular bonuses to hourly wages, the figure decreases to 10 per cent for doctors and 3 per cent for nurses, but is still substantial. This raises serious questions about the agreement's credibility. The representatives of the different institutions share the opinion that collectively agreed wages should be adhered to more closely. A new collective agreement with strategic measures to limit emigration Reaching a wage bargaining solution acceptable to both parties has always been problematic in the Estonian health-care sector. The process is generally lengthy and complicated, with the public conciliator involved in most cases and negotiations often ending in failure. To save space, we focus here on the most recent wage bargaining negotiations. Employee representatives had a number of goals (most of them concentrated on the need to retain health-care workers in the country, notably through better wages and working conditions in general), the most important of which, as pointed out by the representatives of the different institutions, were as follows:
Minimum wage at 80 per cent of the national average wage for doctors and nurses
to reduce the motivation of qualified professionals to work abroad, where wages are considerably higher; to encourage younger specialists to work in the home country rather than abroad; to discourage people from leaving to work in other, better paid sectors in the home country or from changing employer; this applies mainly to care workers. Piret Kruuser, Chair of the Federation of Estonian HealthCare Professionals Unions, said that even an EEK 1 hourly wage difference between hospitals may be enough to induce care workers to change employer (at least within the same town); to increase the staff of health-care institutions and so decrease workload and working intensity, which should guarantee a better quality service.
To summarize, the most recent wage bargaining round proceeded as follows. organizations did not sign the agreement as it did not include a substantial part of health-care specialists, including doctors in training, ambulance staff, family doctors, a substantial part of middle-level health officers and health-care specialists working in state institutions. Although the wages of doctors were de jure not included in the collective agreement, a comparison reveals that average wages in March were at the same level as those demanded by the employee representatives in the latter part of the negotiation process and accepted de facto (EEK 99).
11. The employers' wage offer for doctors, nurses and health care service workers was EEK 90, EEK 46.80 and EEK 27.60, respectively, in 2007, and EEK 108, EEK 56.20 and EEK 33.10, respectively, in 2008 The main criticisms of the agreement were that it failed to include all healthcare specialists and that it did not cover health-care service providers in the private sector. Furthermore, doctors' minimum wages were not revised. 13 The collective agreement did not settle the minimum wages of doctors in training, although increasing their wages was one of the main aims of the employee representatives. 14 According to the secretary general ofEAL, Katrin Rehemaa, this sent a demotivating message to doctors in training, that their contribution was perceived as less important than that of fully qualified doctors, which might have negative side-effects in the longer term; for example, inducing talented specialists to work abroad. The general result emerging from the interviews is that sectoral minimum wages are very important in the health-care sector. Just a month before the new collective agreement came into force, for a substantial proportion (two-thirds) of nurses and care workers, wages were lower than stipulated in the new collective agreement (see Table 4 .9). Therefore we can conclude that the collective agreement reached in 2007 increased the wages of the majority of health-care specialists covered by it to some extent.
Another important point stressed by employee representatives is that a substantial proportion of health-care workers -about 50 per cent -receive wages at or close to the minimum wage laid down in the collective agreement; the same applies if we consider only doctors (according to Piret Kruuser, Chair of the Federation of Estonian Healthcare Professionals Unions; Katrin Rehemaa, secretary general of the Estonian Medical Association). While, in the two largest cities (Tallinn and Tartu), wages were slightly higher than the minimum, in county hospitals most doctors received only the statutory minimum wage (Estonian Medical Association, 2007) . There are no official surveys that would enable us to analyse wage spillover effects and the proportion of workers receiving minimum wages since the present collective agreement came into force. However, according to Piret Kruuser, one side effect of the collective agreement was to narrow the wage dispersion for health-care service workers: in her opinion the wages of the lowest paid specialists (for example, those whose wages were directly affected by the collective agreement) increased more than those in the highest deciles. Thus, although there was a certain degree of spillover, via free access overall wage differences between the lowest (nurses) and highest deciles (doctors) decreased. Concerning future developments, EAL's standpoint with regard to negotiations is that doctors' minimum wages should be twice the national average, which would help to limit their migration in the longer term. EKTK's wage demand for nurses is 60 per cent of the minimum wage of doctors (currently 53 per cent). According to Inna Rahendi, Chair of the Trade Union Association of Health Officers of Estonia, this proportion was agreed between doctors' representatives as early as 1995 when the first collective agreement was reached and is based on the experience of other developed countries. The doctors' representativ~, Katrin Rehemaa, pointed out that the most important aspect of this would be its psychological effect: it would send doctors a signal that their work was valued. As a result, she emphasizes, there would be more stability, which might reduce the desire to migrate and guarantee working stability in the longer run. In her view, as well as that of nurses' representative Inna Rahendi, linking the wages of health-care workers with the national average would ensure that wage developments are more closely connected with the economic situation, the inflation rate, and so on.
Concluding remarks
This case study has shown that the situation is fairly dramatic in health care, with a progressive reduction in the number of health-care specialists as a growing number of nurses and doctors emigrate. Considering the specific skills and training of this labour force, the national minimum wage is not relevant to the problem of low wages in this sector, because they are well above the minimum. This is why collective bargaining rounds have been particularly important in this sector, allowing different categories of health-care worker to be covered by minimum wage rates. Such starting rates are particularly important considering that both nurses' and doctors' minimum wages correspond to 80 per cent of the average wage in their profession.
Due to collective bargaining, both minimum and average wages in the sector have rapidly increased over the years, with pressure from emigration flows also being a factor. This is still not seen as sufficient, however, and has led to the signing of new agreements in the sector. A number of drawbacks remain. More should be done to motivate higher skilled specialists, who are demanding their own minimum wage rates, and to increase wages in line with rises in national productivity and economic growth. If these challenges are met, this combination of national minimum wage and collectively agreed minimum wage rates may well progressively reduce migration among health-care workers.
Case study 3: Minimum wages in the fight against "envelope wages"
All previous studies have indicated a need for caution when interpreting the reported proportions of persons earning the minimum wage because in certain fields of activity it is common practice officially to pay only the minimum wage, but supplemented by unreported additional compensation. In this case study we try to give some idea of how the incidence ofthe minimum wage and envelope wages are related. A number of reports have sought to analyse the incidence of envelope wages in the Baltic States (Kriz et aI., 2007) .
The extent of the phenomenon: considerable in all three Baltic States According to the Working Life Barometer, the share of employees receiving "black" income during 2002 was 10 per cent in Estonia (19 per cent in 1999), 16 per cent in Latvia (22 per cent in 1999) and 7 per cent in Lithuania (12 per cent in 1999) (Antila and Ylostalo 2003) (the share of those receiving black income every month was 9 per cent in Estonia, 8 per cent in Latvia and 3 per cent in Lithuania in 1999). The actual number of people is probably far higher than indicated in surveys (even two or three times higher according to Antila and Ylostalo, 2003) . Surveys by the Estonian Institute of Economic Research have shown that, while 19 per cent of all working-age respondents received unreported wage income in 1999, by 2004 the share had fallen to 14 per cent (Kriz et aI., 2007) . Thus, the declining incidence of envelope wages matches the decline in the number of minimum wage earners, as well as the differences across countries: in 2002, in Estonia, the percentages earning minimum wages and earning envelope wages were, respectively, 7 per cent and 10 per cent, in Latvia 15 per cent and 16 per cent and in Lithuania 9 per cent and 7 per cent.
Any differentiation by earnings groups? Table 4 .10 gives the number of recipients of envelope wages by earnings groups (whether the employee's wage is below or above the minimum wage). Concerning the wage variable, in the survey it was indicated that people should report both their official and unofficial income, if possible. Assuming that the wage variable does in fact include both incomes, we would rather expect that unreported income is more prevalent among those with higher income. Assuming that most people reported only their official income, however, there should be more recipients of envelope wages among those earning minimum wages. As the table shows, in all three countries the proportions are roughly the same for people earning minimum wages and for those earning more, except in Estonia in 2002 (corresponding to the case of people reporting income correctly). We suggest that one possihle reason for this result is the poor enforcement of the minimum wage legislation; that is to say, many people receive earnings below the minimum wage. Second, it seems that some people reported total income and some only official income, in accordance with the abovementioned opinion of Antila and Yl6stalo (2003) that the receipt of envelope wages is not reported correctly. Table 4 .11 presents an estimation of a logit regression on the incidence of envelope wages. The explanatory variables include, among other covariates, the ratio of minimum wages to average wages (Kaitz index). For the Kaitz index, we used the average wage in the relevant industry rather than the national average wage in order to have variations in the value of the index. If a positive impact of the Kaitz index was found on the incidence of envelope wages, this would indicate that a relatively high minimum wage would be associated with envelope wages. The explanation could be that unofficial income would be used to avoid paying minimum wages (to reduce labour costs). If a negative impact was found, in contrast, it would mean that an increase in the Kaitz index results in a reduction in illegal income. Another explanation could be that in sectors with a higher average wage, the minimum wage is less important, so fewer employers resort to envelope wages.
Explanatory variables
The empirical analysis yielded mixed findings for the Baltic States. The Kaitz index was found to have a positive impact on the probability of evasion in Estonia, but a negative and less significant impact in Latvia and Lithuania. This may mean that higher minimum wages provoke higher evasion in Estonia or that unofficial income is used to avoid paying minimum wages. In the other two Baltic countries, the minimum wage may help eventually to reduce envelope wages, as shown in this volume to have been the case in other countries. Further empirical research would be needed to obtain more conclusive results. Table 4 .11 also shows that unreported incomes were found to be more prevalent not only in certain industries (such as construction), but also among secondary jobs, privately owned establishments and among people with lower wages. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Regional dummies have been included in all regressions. Standard errors are robust.
a The default category is employed by private enterprise, in the public sector, where employment has been unchanged within last year, having no secondary job, with non-dominating ethnicity, female and at year 1998.
b The net wage includes here all net income, including income from main and secondary job(s), and including black income (envelope wages). This means that by definition net wage could be correlated with disturbances, but direct tests indicate that this is not a significant problem.
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CONCLUSIONS
Minimum wages in the Baltic States are fixed in bipartite or tripartite negotiations. Their special characteristic, uncommon in most other EU countries, is that a single rate is applied to all employees, without exception. Compared to other EU countries, minimum wage levels have been very low in absolute terms and relatively low in relation to average wages, while the scope of minimum wages has in some years (such as Latvia until 2005) been quite high.
The evidence supports the idea that minimum wages have not been effective in reducing wage disparities -which are rather high in the European context -generally or between workers with certain qualifications; the recent decrease in wage inequality can be attributed to other factors. The importance of minimum wages in the labour market has been more modest, as one might infer from simple indicators, such as the percentage of workers on the minimum wage. The reasons are enforcement problems (concerning people earning less than the minimum wage) and widespread unreported income. Thus, with regard to the Baltic States one must be cautious when interpreting the reported proportions of persons earning the minimum wage because many employers officially pay only the minimum wage and supplement this by unreported additional compensation. The frequency of socalled "envelope wages" is approximately the same among those earning only the minimum wage and those earning more. Unreported income is more common among privately owned establishments, smaller enterprises, secondary jobs, certain industries (such as construction) and people on lower wages. The other important consideration with regard to national minimum wages is the limited extent of collective bargaining (less than 30 per cent of workers covered). The relatively low level of the minimum wage has not inhibited collective bargaining, but there are few branch-level collective agreements.
Social partners' standpoints regarding minimum wages differ and have changed somewhat over time. One issue that has come onto the agenda recently is the potential role of minimum wages in reducing the recent significant emigration to other EU countries, which has contributed to the imbalance between labour supply and demand. The first case study, on the potential role of minimum wages in relation to labour migration in Estonia, based on the migration potential survey, showed that minimum wage earners face certain limitations that inhibit them from working abroad. On the other hand, given that minimum wage earners attach high importance to the wages they earn at home, minimum wages may represent one element among others that could limit labour migration in the future.
Minimum wages are also important in Baltic State labour markets because of the rather limited scope of collective wage bargaining. For certain categories of workers (such as doctors), the national minimum wage is of minor relevance and the wage floor needs to be set with collective agreements. In the second case study, collective wage bargaining in the health-care sector was analysed. The declining workforce and the incentives to emigrate characteristic of this sector have created an imbalance between supply and demand for certain categories of workers. In this context, sectoral minimum wages could play an important role in addition to the national statutory minimum wage. The case study demonstrated how, as a result of collective bargaining, both minimum and average wages in the sector have rapidly increased over the years, though certain drawbacks remain (for example, the collective agreements do not include some health-care specialists). One conclusion from the case study is that the combination of national minimum wage and collectively agreed minimum wage rates may well succeed in progressively reducing emigration incentives among health-care workers.
Another relevant policy issue is whether the minimum wage should be determined solely by annual negotiations or by a commitment to some longterm strategy. As we have seen, in all three Baltic States such strategies have been proposed or negotiated, but not always followed. Such a long-term strategy would result in more predictability in minimum wage developments and, at the same time, could induce the employers to agree to minimum wage rises that might have more of an impact on the labour market. Second, the current practice of undifferentiated minimum wages has been questioned by employers on several occasions. Resistance might further increase if the minimum wage was raised to the levels foreseen in various agreements (such as the "50 per cent of the average wage" target in Latvia by 2010). The economic crisis, however, seems to have brought minimum wage developments to a halt in 2009, if only temporarily. It remains to be seen when the three Baltic states will be able to recover their initial objective of minimum wage upgrading and what role the current minimum wage mechanisms will play in this process. Still, many problems are due to the lack of development of branch-level collective bargaining, and so minimum wages should not be seen as a solution to all issues. Greater differentiation of wage floors is needed.
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